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Abstract
We propose a theory of free movement of goods and labor between two
economies in the presence of moral hazard. Each country produces two final goods
where the productive efforts of workers cannot be perfectly observed, or verified
only in the complex industry. We show that national institutional quality and the
system of the early childhood care and education determine the pattern of
international trade. However, individuals’ decisions to emigrate depend only on the
national institutional quality, where the country with more developed institutions
serves as the host country of immigrants. We conclude that international labor
movement promotes international trade.
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1 Introduction
A number of recent political developments have intensified the free movement of
goods and labor. According to Hatton and Williamson (2005), over the last 30 years
the ratio of exports of goods to GDP has doubled in many countries. Also, in terms of
world population, immigrants’ proportion has increased. The United Nations estimates
that international migrants constituted 3 percent of the world population in 2005. The
tendency toward the international labor liberalization influences the human capital
accumulation in any country, which in turn can change the dynamics of international
trade in the world.
A new, but growing literature reports the importance of national institutional devel-
opment on the pattern and effects of international trade. There are also plenty of
theoretical and empirical papers that investigate the role of educational quality on the
pattern of international labor movement. Moreover, there is a history of theoretical
and empirical exploration into the existence of a relationship between international
trade and international migration. However, researchers have not paid much attention
to the effect of national institutional development on the pattern and consequences of
international labor movement. We find it essential to focus on this gap in the literature
for several reasons. First, not comprehending the effect of national institutional quality
on the pattern and aftermath of international labor migration may lead to an under-
estimation of the benefits of a creation of a common labor market area. For instance,
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we find that international migration boosts international trade. This result is more pro-
found when the country with the most developed institutions has the worst national
early childhood care and educational system (henceforth, ECCE). Moreover, we find
that a creation of a common labor market increases the intensity of human capital ac-
cumulation in the world.
This paper offers a theoretical understanding of the role that ECCE and the national
institutional development play in a country’s accumulation and distribution of human
capital in the presence of moral hazard under free movements of goods and labor. In
this sense, we explore the existence of a mechanical linkage between immigration and
trade. We treat national institutional quality and ECCE as exogenous.1
Our paper presents a simple two-country-Ricardian-trade model under free trade and
immigration. Countries export either a high-skill intensive (complex) good or a low-
skill intensive (simple) good. Exogenous national institutional quality is complementary
to agents’ training acquisitions because more developed national institutions are associ-
ated with lower monitoring costs, which attracts workers willing to provide relatively
high productive efforts, which is more important in producing the complex good. This
is the main force driving the sorting of agents in our model. Ultimately, since relatively
higher national institutional quality attracts skilled immigrants, the country with the
more developed institutions exports the complex good. The quality of the exogenous
ECCE also generates the underlying individuals’ training distribution across countries.
In two otherwise similar economies, the one with the best ECCE will export the com-
plex good. When a country obtains relatively better ECCE such that individuals acquire
high training levels, but national institutional quality is low such that agents’ training
levels are underutilized, out-migration toward the country with better institutions occurs.
This paper is a generalization of Vogel (2007) to allow for immigration and ECCE. In
order to motivate the international movement of labor, countries are given differential
training endowments, which are endogenously determined by the existence of the ex-
ogenous national quality of institutions and ECCE. This drives the additional mechan-
ism that departs from Vogel (2007). Our model shows that differences in relative
national institutional quality and underlying training endowments will not straightfor-
wardly drive migration. We find that because migration will be selective on individuals’
training levels, it will alter the pattern of comparative advantage in international trade.
Our approach presents an opportunity to understand international trade, immigra-
tion and education simultaneously in a single model. Each country has a large number
of firms grouped into two industries, a simple and a complex one. There are two final
goods produced using only labor. In the simple sector, individuals work alone and pro-
duce a simple good. In the other sector, production of a complex good is determined
by collaboration between a worker and a manager. If a manager is able to measure
perfectly a worker’s efforts, then the second has no incentive to provide unproductive
efforts. But the manager is unable to identify perfectly worker’s efforts. The level of
unproductive efforts depends not only on the worker’s wage that she receives, but also
on the degree of imperfectability of the labor contracts. We assume that the latter is
related to the development of national institutions. The more developed national insti-
tutions, the lower worker’s unproductive effort levels will be.
Individuals have the same homothetic preferences toward accumulation of human
capital, but they possess different natural ability levels. The higher their ability, the
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lower their cost of acquiring high training levels. The more trained workers are, the less
their unproductive effort levels. An individual knows that it is costly for her to acquire
training subject to her natural ability and efforts subject to her training. However, a bet-
ter trained manager under more developed national institutions is compensated more
for her ability to reduce moral hazard in the complex sector. An efficient matching
process takes place, where the most talented workers pair up with the most talented
managers and enter in the complex sector. The least talented individuals enter in the
simple sector.
In some sectors it is impossible for a manager of a firm to perfectly observe the pro-
ductive efforts of her employees who engage in a team project during the production
process. For example, in an interdisciplinary research project conducted from two
researchers that are specialized in two distant academic subjects, if one of the researchers
is the manager, and the other the worker, it is hard for the former to evaluate the latter
because the manager can judge her part of the research but is unable to perfectly evaluate
the part of the research conducted by the worker. She therefore cannot perfectly measure
the value of their interdisciplinary research project. However, the manager has perfect
information about the training levels of her employee but imperfect information about
her productive efforts during the production process. She can design a wage contract
that values her employee’s work subject to certain norms that are perfectly measured
and verified such as the quality of her employees’ ideas and determination in the
working process. Managers with higher training levels can better evaluate a perform-
ance measure of their employees.
No matter how skillful a manager is, there are still outside factors, such as the broad
national institutional development that could encourage employees to increase their in-
dividual productive efforts in the team production. We assume that better developed
national institutions provide a higher quality of the performance and verifiability mea-
sures of the firms that operate in the complex sector.
ECCE is another factor that influences individuals’ decision about their skill level.
Two individuals who are born with the same natural ability, but live in countries with
different ECCE, will acquire different skill levels. It is easier for the one who lives in the
country with the best ECCE to accumulate more skills and, therefore, to exert more
productive effort levels in the complex industry. One may imagine a different label for
ECCE, such as a natural cultural identity that promotes ECCE independent of the
evolution of the national institutional development. For example, Japan has better
ECCE than the USA, at least according to the survival rate to grade 5,2 but the USA
has better national institutions than Japan, as proxied by the rule of law index taken
from Kaufmann et al. (2010), which measures, among other factors, the quality of
contract enforcement. In Table 1, we present the above indexes, where the ECCE
index is taken from UNESCO EFA (2010) and the rule of law index is taken from
Kaufmann et al. (2010).3
In our model, countries are assumed to vary only in the development of their institu-
tions and ECCE. Under free trade, the country with the best ECCE and the most devel-
oped institutions contains more highly skilled individuals who seek employment in the
complex industry, and therefore, these countries export the complex good. In a com-
mon labor market regime, the country with the best developed institutions is the host
country of immigrants. Only the most talented individuals prefer to emigrate toward
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the country with the best developed institutions because there they capture higher
incomes for their training levels. National institutional quality acts as the sole deter-
minant of the pattern of international labor movement.
We show that immigration promotes international trade especially in a scenario when
the country with the most developed institutions has the worst ECCE. According to
Table 1, one can find a plethora of countries that satisfy these conditions. For example,
Croatia, Democratic Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Italy, Belarus, Spain, and Japan have
better ECCE than USA, but the latter has more developed institutions than all the
above countries. Thus, if these countries differ only in the development of their
national level of institutions and ECCE, then according to our theory their autarky
prices could quite possibly be the same, providing no incentives for international trade.
However, under a common market area, we observe a movement of labor from the
country with the least developed institutions (Italy) toward the country with the most
developed ones (USA). Immigration changes the division of labor in both countries,
giving unequivocal comparative advantage in the complex good to the country with the
most developed institutions (USA). Thus, international labor movement creates inter-
national trade. This is true not only in the above scenario, but as long as there are na-
tional institutional differences, independent of the ECCE.
We also examine the effects of international students on trade, assuming that coun-
tries also differ in their national training systems. It follows that the country with the
best ECCE, training system and more developed institutions exports the complex good.
However, when international students must return to their country of origin after
graduation, we show that it is possible that the host country will eventually export the
simple good under the scenario that the latter has a better quality of institutions and
training systems, but worse ECCE.
This paper contributes to the recent and growing literature on institutions and inter-
national trade. It argues that the quality of institutions and ECCE act as independent
sources of comparative advantage in a country. This result is consistent with Vogel
(2007); Costinot (2009); Grossman (2004); Levchenko (2007); Matsuyama (2005); and
Nunn (2007). We follow Vogel (2007) by developing a simple theoretical game in which
each individual chooses her sector of employment, training level, production team, and
efforts. Our model differs from all of the above because we allow for immigration and
ECCE. A distinct contribution of our model is to make ECCE the sole determinant of
the pattern of international trade in the presence of moral hazard.
This paper adds to literature on international trade and the allocation of talent simi-
lar to Vogel (2007); Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007); Rosen (1981); and Lucas (1978). This
paper is different from the above in the definition of talent, which is defined as some-
thing that an individual with given natural ability develops through the interaction of
the national institutional development and ECCE.
This paper also contributes to the literature on economics of immigration. It shows
that only the most skilled individuals immigrate in the country with the most devel-
oped institutions. This is consistent with Abowd and Freeman (1991); Blanchard and
Katz (1992); Borjas (1987, 1992, 1993); Freeman (1993); and Jensen (1988). Our paper
differs notably in terms of the mechanism through which the incentives of individuals
to emigrate are determined. It sheds light on a separate channel, the national institu-
tional development, which resolves the pattern of international labor migration.4
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Finally, this paper adds to the literature that explores the linkage between immigra-
tion and international trade. In a classical paper, Mundell (1957), using a basic
Heckscher-Ohlin model, shows that international trade and immigration are substi-
tutes. Markusen (1983) claims that there exists complementarity between immigration
and trade for low barriers’ costs using a typical Heckscher-Ohlin framework. However,
if the barriers’ costs related to international trade or/and international factor movements
are too large, his conclusions are reversed.5 The result of our model is consistent with
Markusen in that immigration promotes international trade, but we use a Ricardian trade
model. Our paper differs from Markusen (1983) when barrier costs are too large. In such
a case, our model predicts that international trade and immigration still complement each
other because individuals with the highest natural ability find it beneficial to emigrate
toward the country with the most developed institutions, since they will be rewarded for
reducing moral hazard. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first one that links
immigration and trade using a simple Ricardian model in the presence of moral hazard.
The rest of the paper is organized into seven sections. In Section II, we describe a
five-stage theoretical game in a two sector economy. In Section III, we solve the five-
stage theoretical game for a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in a closed economy
in the presence of moral hazard. Section IV investigates the pattern of international trade.
Section V explores human capital accumulation in both countries under a common labor
market area. Section VI allows for temporary or permanent migration of individuals in
purse of their studies, and section VII concludes. The proofs of all propositions and corol-
laries are provided in Appendix C. See Additional file 1: Appendix C.
2 The model
The economy has two sectors (X and Y). In the Ysector, individuals work alone. They own their
own firm where they produce good y. For convenience, we call this sector “the simple sector.”6
In the X sector, production of the final good is determined as a result of a team work between a
manager (the firm’s owner) and a worker, where the manager is unable to identify perfectly
worker’s efforts presenting incentives to the latter to provide unproductive efforts. We assume
that the unproductive efforts are related to the country’s institutional quality and to the level of a
worker’s andmanager’s ability.We refer to theX sector as the “complex sector”.
We illustrate the timing of the four stage game in Fig. 1. An individual is born with a
certain level of natural ability that she uses together with the benefits from ECCE to
choose the industry in which she will seek employment. Then, she decides the optimal
level of her industry-specific training. Throughout this paper, college/university educa-
tion refers to industry-specific training. Using her training under perfect information
on the development of national institutions, she picks the appropriate production team.
Finally, she chooses the level and the nature of effort to supply in her work. The above
four-stage game is solved for a symmetric, subgame-perfect equilibrium using backward
induction, where the utility of an individual, who consumes Cl units of the final good l,
Fig. 1 The four stage-game
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with natural ability q, and sector-specific training t, who supplies an amount of pro-
ductive efforts a, and an amount of unproductive efforts d, under a ECCE b, is given by





a2 þ d2 − 1
2bq
t2 ð1Þ
Individuals have identical and homothetic preferences represented by u Cx;Cy
  ¼ Cβy
C1−βx and the income of an individual is I = x + py, where p is the relative price of good
y, thus, x is the numeraire. Each individual maximizes her utility function subject to
her income level, giving the following
V a; dð Þ ¼ RI− 1
2t
a2 þ d2 − 1
2q
t2 ð2Þ
where R≡ββ(1 − β)1 − βp− β. There are many competitive firms in each sector. Each firm
in the simple sector consists of one individual who exerts (a) effort levels. Each firm in
the complex sector consists of a manager and a worker, where the manager exerts am
productive efforts, while the worker exerts aw productive and dw unproductive efforts.
Each type of effort is costly, but only the productive efforts increase firm’s output. The
production functions in both sectors exhibit constant returns to scale, as described in
the following two equations
y að Þ ¼ a x aw; amð Þ ¼ 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃawamp ð3Þ
In the Y sector, an individual who provides one unit of labor exerting effort (a) gets
in return (a) units of final good y. In the X sector, the final good is produced as a result
of matched efforts of a manager and a worker. We follow the assumption of comple-
mentarities in production. A firm with a manager who provides one unit of labor exert-





units of final good x.
In the fourth stage, in sector Y, an individual provides the effort level that maximizes
her firm’s profit. In the complex sector, a manager exerts the amount of effort that
maximizes the firm’s profit, while a worker exerts the amount of effort that maximizes
her income defined in the performance measure, where the latter is defined as follows





where tm denotes the training level obtained by a manager; aw and dw respectively
denote the amount of unobservable productive and unproductive efforts of the worker
w paired with the manager m. Thus, since θ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the national institutional
quality, the higher θ, or/and the higher the tm, the better the manager’s monitoring of
the worker’s unproductive efforts.
In the third stage, in the complex sector, individuals choose their production team.
Potential managers offer a contract based on a potential workers’ performance measure
as defined above. Managers observe and verify workers’ training levels, but they are
unable to monitor perfectly the level of effort that workers put into the production
process. Also, workers accept the contract after observing managers’ training levels. In
the equilibrium, workers and managers pair up, subject to their training levels.
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In the second stage, which only in the simple sector is the same as the third stage, an
individual chooses her level of training that maximizes her firm’s profit. In the complex
sector, a manager chooses her optimal level of training in order to maximize her firm’s
profit and a worker decides on her optimal level of job training that maximizes her
wage, which is determined in the third stage.
In the first stage we determine individuals’ choice of industry, where they cannot be
employed simultaneously in both sectors. We assume that individual’s natural abilities
and ECCE are both exogenous, where qi ∈ [qmin, qmax], qi > 0, & b ≥ 1. Please note that
we drop the underscript (i) when necessary for notation simplicity.
3 Labor distribution and moral hazard
This section describes the equilibrium in a closed economy with two sectors. First, we
focus in sector Y, where on the fourth stage an individual’s optimal productive efforts
are a = Rpt. Thus, the utility of an individual who works in the simple sector with opti-
mal effort levels is





We skip the third stage, since for simplicity individuals work alone in this sector.
In the second stage, an individual’s optimal levels of training are t ¼ 12 Rpð Þ2bqy .
These lead to
Vy ¼ 18 Rpð Þ
4bq ð6Þ
In the complex sector, in the last stage, a manager endowed with tm units of train-
ing, who provides am productive efforts, pairs up with a worker endowed with tw
units of training, who supplies aw productive and dw unproductive efforts. Man-
ager’s income comes from her firm’s profit which are Π = x − wK, where her homo-
thetic preferences are Vm ¼ RΠ− 12tm a2m− 12bqm t
2
m . A worker’s homothetic preferences






w . The optimal unproductive effort levels exerted
by a worker are dw ¼ Rwtw e1−θ−1tm . More developed institutions and more trained man-
agers increase the verifiability of a worker’s productive efforts. The optimal productive ef-
fort levels for a worker are aw = Rwtw indicating that they are a monotonically increasing
function of her training levels and wage.
In the third stage, a manager presents a wage to a worker after observing the
worker’s training levels. The worker decides on whether to accept it knowing the
manager’s training levels. A manager (worker) maximizes her profits (income) by
designing (accepting) a contract that corresponds to her’s (manager’s) and the
worker’s levels of training, subject to the quality of institutions. We maximize the
aggregate post-training utilities of a worker and a manager who work together in a
team and denoted with Λ, which represents the total post-training utility derived from
matching a manager with training tm with a worker with training tw. Maximizing Λ
over the wage, we find the optimal wage












shows the quality of the monitoring ability of a manager with
training tm and national institutional development level θ. The more developed the
national institutions, or/and the more skilled a manager, the higher the quality of a
manager’s monitoring ability will be. Substituting the wage with the optimal wage in
the aggregate post-training utility of the firm, we show that the manager and the
worker must have the same training level in equilibrium in order to maximize their
own utilities.7 Thus, the optimal wage after the matching process is w ¼ Ψ34.
In the second stage, we find the optimal levels of training for an individual who

















∂b > 0, the better the ECCE, the higher her optimal training levels will be. Thus,
the utility of an individual with optimal training and qx skill levels, who works in
sector X is
Vx ¼ Vm ¼ Vw ¼ 14R
2Ψ 3=2tx ð9Þ
Individuals who work in the complex sector get a higher level of satisfaction for a
higher quality of the manager’s monitoring ability, which is positively related to the na-
tional development of institutions.
In the first stage, an individual chooses her sector of employment. Combining (6)
with (9) implies that she is indifferent when choosing a sector only if Vx =Vy.
In sector X, the higher an individual’s training levels, the more developed national in-
stitutions are, the higher a manager’s ability of the performance measure, or the better
ECCE, the higher an individual’s level of satisfaction will be. We summarize the above
results with the help of the following three propositions.
3.1 Proposition 1
In a closed economy with θ ∈ [0, 1) there exists a q* ∈ [qmin, qmax], such that individuals
join the complex sector if and only if q > q*.
Individuals with higher levels of natural ability have more incentives to obtain higher level of
training because it is relatively easier for them. They join the complex sector. Since there is a
positive relationship between individuals’ training levels and their natural ability, there must
exist a unique level of natural ability. Individuals who possess higher levels of natural ability than
the threshold level will enter into the complex sector. The uniqueness of q* is determined by the
relationships of optimal training levels and natural ability levels. Then, corollary 1 follows.
3.2 Corollary 1
The following inequalities hold: i) ∂q

∂θ < 0; & iiÞ ∂q

∂b < 0.
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Part i) indicates that better national institutions increase the incentives of individuals
to join the complex sector since Vχ is increasing in the quality of institutions, but Vy is
independent of the institutional quality [see (6), (8) and (9)]. The second part states
that better ECCE provide extra incentives for individuals to seek employment in the
complex sector. From proposition 1, we know that individuals who obtain relatively
high level of training work in the complex sectors. The more trained individuals are
those with relatively high natural ability. This is formalized in proposition 2.
3.3 Proposition 2
In a closed economy, in the presence of moral hazard:
1) ∀ q ≥ q*, tx(q) is convex in q;
2Þ∀ q≥q; tx qð Þ > ty qð Þ;
Proposition 2 shows that any individual with a natural ability greater than the thresh-
old level (q*) accumulates a higher level of training if she enters into the complex sec-
tor. In our model, this statement is obvious because an individual’s level of training is a
strictly convex function of her natural ability for all individuals who enter into the com-
plex sector, X, while it is a linear function of her natural ability for those who enter into
the simple sector, Y. We illustrate the statements of part 1) and 2) of proposition 2 in
Fig. 2, where in the vertical axes we plot the values of all individuals’ levels of training
[ ti(q*)] as a function of their natural ability (q). An individual optimizes her utility and
therefore enters into the simple sector only if her natural ability is strictly smaller than
the threshold level, and she enters into the complex sector if her natural ability is equal
or greater than the threshold level. As one can observe from Fig. 2, there is a jump
point in levels of training right at the threshold level of utility. The red curve represents
the tx function for all q ≥ q* and the blue line illustrates ty function for all q ≥ q*, where
θ ∈ [0, 1) and q* ∈ [qmin, qmax].
Fig. 2 Training levels as a function of natural ability
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3.4 Proposition 3
In a closed economy, where θ ∈ [0, 1), the income of an individual who works in the
complex sector is strictly higher than that of an individual who works in the simple
sector for all q > q*.
Proposition 3 states that individuals who have greater natural ability than the
threshold are strictly richer if they enter into the complex sector than they would
have been had they entered the simple one. Their utility is higher in the complex
sector as compared to the simple sector, while their utility cost of obtaining train-
ing is strictly higher in the complex sector. Therefore, their income must be
strictly higher.
4 The effects of international trade in two large economies
In this section, we associate the existence of a trade pattern with the differences
on the distribution of training levels in the labor force of each country. The allo-
cation of training levels in the labor force is determined by the distribution of
natural ability levels, ECCE, and development of national institutions. We assume
there are two countries (H & O) with two sectors each, a simple and a complex
one. Both countries are the same in all aspects except the quality of their institu-
tions and ECCE.
We first assume that both countries have institutions of identical quality, but H offers
a better ECCE than O. Under free trade, we can determine the distribution of training
levels in their labor force and, therefore, predict the pattern of international trade. We
assume that even after free trade each country is incompletely specialized in the pro-
duction of both goods. Also, for convenience, suppose that the distributions of the
natural ability levels in both countries are exactly the same; however, H offers a better
ECCE for all its citizens as compared to O. Using our notation, bH > bO, then propos-
ition 4 follows.
4.1 Proposition 4
In each country in the presence of moral hazard, where θj = θ, j≡(O,H), there exists a
unique (q*)j, such that individuals enter into the complex sector if and only if qj > (q*)j.
Thus, the assumption that bH > bO implies that
1Þ qð ÞH < qð ÞO ∀ q > 0
2Þ qð ÞO≥qmin and qð ÞH≤qmax
Part 1 of proposition 4 states that the country with the best ECCE obtains a labor
force that consists of more highly skilled individuals. It is cheaper to produce the com-
plex good in H. Thus, H exports the complex good to O in exchange for imports of the
simple good from O. The main implication of proposition 4 is that it considers the
ECCE as a unique, independent source of comparative advantage in the presence of
moral hazard. Assuming that both countries have the same ECCE, but H has more
developed institutions than O, proposition 5 follows.
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4.2 Proposition 5
In each country with θ < 1, where bj = b, there exists a unique (q*)j, such that individuals
enter into the complex sector if and only if qj > (q*)j. Thus, θH > θO implies that
1Þ qð ÞH < qð ÞO ∀ qj > 0
2Þ qð ÞO≥qmin and qð ÞH≤qmax
The quality of national institutions acts as an independent source of comparative
advantage. Country H exports the complex good as a result of having a labor force that
consists of more talented individuals because it has better developed institutions as com-
pared to country O. Thus, relatively more individuals of country H seek employment into
the complex sector, where they obtain higher levels of training, and therefore provide
more productive efforts in order to gain higher income levels. Thus, corollary 2 follows.
4.3 Corollary 2
Under free trade, with θ < 1, where bj = b & θH > θO (or θj = θ & bH > bO)
1Þ tx qð ÞH > tx qð ÞO ∀q > qð ÞH
2Þ Ix qð ÞH > Ix qð ÞO ∀q > qð ÞH
We illustrate the situations presented in both propositions in Fig. 3. In the vertical
axes, we plot the values of the relative price of the simple good, and in the horizontal
axes we plot the values of the relative quantity of the simple good. Since individuals
have identical and homothetic preferences, the relative demand line is the same for
Fig. 3 World equilibrium under free trade
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both countries. But, in autarky, RSO lies in the right of RSH because the labor force of
O consists of relatively less highly trained workers. Thus, the relative autarky price of
the simple good in O is lower than in H. Hence, O should export the simple good
to H and import the complex good from H. Therefore, the world relative price of
the simple good post-trade should be between the relative autarky prices of O and
H. In summary, propositions 4 & 5 indicate that under free trade, the country that
has a better ECCE or/and more developed institutions exports the complex good
and imports the simple good.
5 The effects of emigration in two large economies
In this section, we associate individuals’ decision to emigrate with their income differ-
ence, subject to their natural ability, which exists between the two countries. We
assume that there exist fixed costs of immigration, such as language and culture bar-
riers. Suppose that both countries only differ in the quality of their institutions and
their ECCE. Let’s first assume that H has more developed institutions (θH > θO), but has
identical ECCE with O (bH = bO). Therefore, according to proposition 5, H will export
the complex good to O. If two countries enter in a common labor market area, we can
predict the pattern of international labor movement with the help of the following
proposition.
5.1 Proposition 6
Under free international movement of labor:
1) In each country with θ < 1, where bj = b and θH > θO, there exists a unique (q*)j, such
that individuals enter into the X sector if and only if qj > (q*)j
2Þ qð ÞO≥qmin and qð ÞH≤qmax
3Þ qð ÞH < qð ÞO ∀ qj > 0 and Ix qð ÞH > Ix qð ÞO ∀q > q
4) H is the host and O the origin country of immigrants if and only if there exists a ~q
such that Ix qð ÞH > Ix qð ÞO þ c
h i
∀q > ~q, where ~q > qð ÞH and 0 < c < (q*)O − (q*)H
Part 1), 2) and 3) of proposition 6 replicate proposition 5 and corollary 2, but for
open labor markets, where ~q denotes the migration threshold level. The main implica-
tion of proposition 6 is related to part 4), which states that national institutional quality
acts as an independent source of the international migration, where c denotes the fixed
costs of immigration. This states that H will continue to export the complex good as a
result of having more highly trained individuals than O because H has more developed
institutions. Thus, most individuals in H seek employment in the complex sector where
they are compensated more. Individuals who have the exact same natural ability and
work in the complex sector but live in different countries obtain dissimilar levels of
income due to differences in the development of the national institutions. There will be
no emigration of any individual who works in the simple sector because the quality of
national institutions is not related to their income levels. However, an individual who
works in the complex sector in country H enjoys a higher income as compared to the
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income of an individual who works in the same sector in country O and has exactly the
same natural ability levels. Therefore, proposition 7 follows.
5.2 Proposition 7
Under free movements of goods and labor, where bj = b and θH > θO
1) Only the most talented individuals of country O will emigrate toward H.
2) There exists a q that corresponds to a c such that individuals with q < qO < qð ÞO
from O will immigrate in H to enter in the complex sector. They would have never
entered into the complex sector in the absence of a common labor market.
Part 1) of proposition 7 states that because country H has better institutions, the in-
come of an individual who works in the complex sector in H is strictly higher than the
income of an individual who possesses an identical skill level but works in the complex
sector in O. Thus, such an individual of O has an incentive to immigrate in H only if
her difference of income due to immigration exceeds the fixed costs of immigration.
Part 2) of proposition 7 implies that with the opening of the labor markets, there will
be an increase in production of the complex good because some individuals from O
[those with q < qO < qð ÞO ] will immigrate in H for low fixed costs of immigration
c < qð ÞO−q
h i
. Therefore, the relative world price of the simple good increases. We
illustrate this situation in Fig. 4, where we borrow the world relative demand and sup-
ply from Fig. 3. According to proposition 7, in a world with free movements of goods
and labor, the number of highly trained individuals in the world will increase, enhan-
cing the production of the complex good. RSW should shift to the left in the (p, Y/X)
space when we move in a common labor market. Consequently, the world relative
price of the simple good should be higher than before. This is indicated by (pW* > pW)
in our graph.
Let’s assume that H has an identical quality level of institutions (θj = θ), but offers a
better ECCE (bH > bO) than O. In a free trade world according to proposition 4, H
Fig. 4 World equilibrium under free movement of goods and labor
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exports the complex good to O and imports the simple good from O. In a common
labor market, no one has an incentive to emigrate because there are no differences in
income among individuals with identical training levels who work in different coun-
tries. Thus, institutional quality is the sole determinant of international labor flows.
Let’s consider a third and final scenario where H has better institutions, but O has a
better ECCE. This means that both countries could have the same cutoff, q*, which
indicates that they will produce the same amount of both goods. Put differently, the
host country of immigrants has more developed institutions, and despite its weak
ECCE, its citizens will invest more in their training and put in more productive effort
since they get rewarded more for reducing moral hazard as compared to individuals
with the exact same levels of natural ability who live in the country with the least devel-
oped institutions. On the other hand, since the country with the least developed in-
stitutions offers the best ECCE, many of its individuals will seek employment in
the complex sector because it is easier for them to obtain more training and,
therefore, put in more productive effort even though they are rewarded less as
compared to the same able individuals who live in the host country of immigrants.
Therefore, it is fairly feasible that both countries have the same prices in autarky.
Consequently, in this case, if both countries create a common trade area, there will
be no trade between them. However, if both countries decide to liberalize their
labor markets, we would observe emigration only in one direction, from country O
into H, since as demonstrated in proposition 7, the national institutional difference
between the two countries is the only force that derives international migration in
the presence of moral hazard. All immigrants will seek employment in the complex
industry in the host country because only in the X industry are they are rewarded
more, as compared to their country of origin, for reducing moral hazard. It could
be possible, as shown in proposition 7, that for low fixed costs of immigration
c < qð ÞO−q
h i
, some emigrants of O (those with qH* < q < qO*) who were working
in the simple sector under free trade in their country of origin will seek employ-
ment in the complex sector in the host country of immigrants because of the ex-
istence of the institutional differences between the two countries. This in turn, will
change the world production of both goods and will create international trade be-
tween the two countries. Thus, corollary 3 follows.
5.3 Corollary 3
In a free trade world that consists of two large economies, in the presence of moral
hazard, where bO > bH, and θO < θH, and with autarky prices pH = pO, there will be no
international trade between the two countries. However, if both countries create a com-
mon labor market area, it is profitable for both countries to engage in international
trade only for low fixed costs of immigration c < qð ÞO−q
 
.
The above corollary is an important contribution of the paper because it highlights
the fact that immigration promotes trade. In Table 1, we can find countries where the
development of their national institutions is not accompanied with better ECCE. For
example, the USA has more developed institutions than Japan, but the latter has better
ECCE than the former because, among other things, the Japanese society has developed
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a natural cultural identity that promotes ECCE where most of the young Japanese
mothers pay their fullest attention to the education of their children at their young age.
We can also compare the USA with Croatia, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Belarus,
Italy, and Spain. The former has more developed institutions than each of the latter
countries, but all these countries have better ECCE than the USA. Therefore, according
to corollary 3, if these countries only differ in the development of their national institu-
tions and ECCE, in the absence of a common labor market area, it is quite possible to
see trade between each of them and the U.S. However, in our model, if we allow the
international movement of labor, the U.S. will be the host country of the most highly
trained immigrants because it has the most developed institutions. Thus, we introduce
a new explanation (which is the quality of national institutions) for the existence of the
flow of the most trained international migrants from other countries into the USA.
Moreover, according to corollary 3, the creation of a common labor market area among
the above countries will increase the bilateral trade between USA and each of the above
countries.
We can observe from Table 1, that Germany has more developed national institu-
tions, but worse ECCE than Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, France, Portugal, Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Belgium, Estonia, and Lithuania. Thus, according to prop-
osition 7, Germany will be the host country of the most highly trained immigrants, as-
suming that countries only differ in their ECCE and the development of national
institutions. Moreover, according to corollary 3, the existence of the common labor
market area, such as EU, directly boosts bilateral international trade between Germany
and each of the above EU members.
However, this highly specialized example as presented in corollary 3 is created to
clarify the intuition behind the complementarity of immigration and international trade
in our model. It should be obvious to the reader that all is needed for immigration to
promote trade in this model is to assume that the host country possesses more devel-
oped institutions than the origin country of immigrants.
6 The effects of international students in two large economies
So far, we have assumed that individuals are not allowed to migrate to acquire
training, which in our model refers to formal college/university education. In what
follows we focus on effects that the presence of international students have in both
economies. First, we assume that all international students can become permanent
immigrants in the host country after graduation and then assume instead that
international students must return back to their country of origin after training in
the host country.
Using each of the above assumptions, we can write the utility of each individual as
shown in (1) as





a2 þ d2 − 1
2bq
t2 ð10Þ
where s ≥ 1 denotes the system of training in a country. Thus, in countries with a high
quality of training, maybe because of tradition or/and historical accident, s ≥ 1 implies
that it is easier for an individual to obtain higher training levels maybe due to a positive
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spillover or environmental effect that a better national system of training creates. Thus,
individuals will acquire international training in the country with higher s if they can
afford the fixed cost of international training such as language and cultural barriers.
Therefore, the country with better ECCE and a national system of training and more
developed institutions will export the complex good. Analogously to proposition 4,
ceteris paribus, the national system of training will act as an independent source of
comparative advantage.
The analysis of this section is interesting under the scenario that the host coun-
try has the more developed institutions and the best quality of training, but the
origin country has the best ECCE.8 When international students are allowed to im-
migrate into the host country after graduation, the complex sector in the host
country will expand because the most able students of the origin country that
would have entered in the complex sector in their country of origin would pursue
their training in the host country and remain there. Moreover, there would be
more individuals in the world that will seek employment in the complex sector be-
cause analogously to proposition 7, there would be some individuals of the origin
country that will enter in sector X basically because now they have the option of
obtaining better training in the host country. Therefore, the pattern of trade would
be the same as in the previous sections, and international students will promote
further trade between countries because all international students who will seek
employment in the complex sector will remain in the host country where they are
rewarded more for reducing moral hazard as compared to their country of origin,
which has the worst quality of national institutions.
If international students must return back to their country of origin after the comple-
tion of their training, the pattern of trade may change.9 In the absence of international
students, the free movement of goods and labor similar to proposition 7 will assure that
the country with the best developed national institutions and training system but worse
ECCE to be the host country of immigrants and export the complex good. However, if
we allow individuals to acquire international training, especially in an extreme scenario
when the differences over the development of national institutions in both countries is
low {(θH − θO) ≃ 0}, but the differences of national training systems and the differences
on ECCE are large {(sH − sO) ≃∞; (bO − bH) ≃∞}, the pattern of trade may change, but
the pattern of labor movements remains the same. The country with the best insti-
tutions and system of training will host the international students. However, now
trade and the cross-border movement of students are substitutes. An individual
with the high natural ability who is born in the country with better ECCE will
acquire training in the foreign country with a better training system and, therefore,
obtain a higher level of training than the native with the same natural ability. If
her natural ability in her country of origin is higher than the threshold level (as
shown in proposition 1), she will seek employment in the complex sector because
her wage/profit there will be higher (as shown in proposition 3). Thus, it is quite
possible that the inflow of international students who must leave the country with
the best institutions and training system after the completion of their training to
change the pattern of trade in both countries, shifting the comparative advantage
in the complex good towards the country with the best ECCE, which will have a
better trained workforce.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze a general equilibrium model in the presence of moral hazard
between two large economies that have two sectors. In the complex sector, firms pro-
duce a complex good where managers cannot perfectly observe or/and verify the pro-
ductive efforts of workers. In the simple sector, the productive efforts of workers and
firms’ outputs are perfectly observable and verifiable. We develop a four-stage game
similar to Vogel (2007), but we introduce ECCE and allow for immigration. In our
model the distribution of labor is endogenously determined by individuals’ choices sub-
ject to the ECCE and national institutional development.
We show that individuals with the highest levels of natural ability prefer to work in
the complex sector where the most trained workers team up with the most trained
managers. The remaining individuals join the simple sector. The country with the best
ECCE or/and quality of institutions obtains a labor force that consists mainly of highly
trained individuals. Thus, in a free trade world, it exports the complex good. In a
common labor market area, the country which exports the complex good is the host
country of immigrants. Only the most talented individuals emigrate toward the country
with the best developed institutions because there they capture higher incomes for their
training.
We present a scenario where the country with the most developed institutions has
the worst ECCE. For example, according to Table 1, Germany has more developed
institutions than Poland, but the latter has better ECCE than the former. In such a case,
it is fairly feasible that the autarky prices of both countries are the same, providing no
incentives for international trade. However, if both countries enter a common labor
market area, we observe a movement of labor from the country with the least devel-
oped institutions (Poland) toward the country with the most developed institutions
(Germany). Thus, immigration changes the division of labor in both countries. In other
words, a creation of a common labor market area enhances international trade. Even
though this is an extreme scenario, it is created to clarify the intuition behind the com-
plementarity of immigration and trade.
When we allow the cross-border movement of students to acquire better training, we
show that the country with the best quality of national institutions, training system and
ECCE exports the complex good. However, if international students are not allowed to
immigrate in the country where they completed their studies, it is possible that the host
country will eventually import the complex good if it has better quality of institutions
and training system, but worse ECCE.
While we hope our approach provides some interesting insights on the questions of
talent development and immigration, as well as international trade and immigration, it
does not tackle an important number of dimensions. For instance, the positive assortative
matching between a worker and a manager relies on the assumption of complementarities
in the production of the complex good. Thus, a possible extension of the model is to solve
the four stage game developed here under the assumption of substitutabilities in the pro-
duction of the complex good. Another possible interesting extension of the model is to in-
clude certain spillover effects associated with the availability of the most talented
individuals in a country.
We assume that individuals’ training decisions are made in a common labor market
area. It could be interesting to analyze the case where individuals do not anticipate the
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Table 1 National Institutional Quality Index (RL) and ECCE index (ECCE)
Countries/Territories RL ECCE Countries/Territories RL ECCE
ALBANIA −0.44 0.952 LUXEMBOURG 1.83 0.964
ALGERIA −0.75 0.950 MACAO SAR, CHINA 0.70 0.989
ARGENTINA −0.62 0.954 MALTA 1.44 0.835
ARMENIA −0.47 0.977 MAURITIUS 0.86 0.980
AUSTRALIA 1.76 0.990 MEXICO −0.58 0.960
AZERBAIJAN −0.85 0.964 MONGOLIA −0.39 0.941
BELARUS −1.04 0.997 MOROCCO −0.16 0.939
BELGIUM 1.37 0.965 NAMIBIA 0.19 0.915
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA −0.37 0.987 NETHERLANDS 1.81 0.990
BOTSWANA 0.67 0.966 NEW ZEALAND 1.87 0.990
BULGARIA −0.10 0.974 NORWAY 1.92 0.995
CROATIA 0.17 0.991 PANAMA −0.10 0.946
CUBA −0.66 0.970 PERU −0.60 0.932
CYPRUS 1.20 0.954 POLAND 0.66 0.980
DENMARK 1.90 0.997 PORTUGAL 1.04 0.990
EGYPT, ARAB REP. −0.12 0.972 QATAR 0.95 0.955
ESTONIA 1.13 0.988 ROMANIA 0.04 0.971
FIJI −0.85 0.943 RUSSIAN FEDERATION −0.77 0.961
FINLAND 1.98 0.997 SAMOA 0.65 0.964
FRANCE 1.51 0.990 SAUDI ARABIA 0.26 0.939
GEORGIA −0.21 0.964 SERBIA −0.40 0.986
GERMANY 1.62 0.962 SLOVENIA 0.98 0.996
HUNGARY 0.75 0.977 SPAIN 1.16 0.997
ICELAND 1.70 0.990 SURINAME −0.10 0.941
IRELAND 1.77 0.993 SWAZILAND −0.49 0.962
ISRAEL 0.90 0.990 SWEDEN 1.96 0.995
ITALY 0.38 0.996 SWITZERLAND 1.77 0.990
JAMAICA −0.50 0.961 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC −0.50 0.946
JAPAN 1.33 1.000 TUNISIA 0.12 0.961
KOREA, DEM. REP. 0.99 0.994 TURKEY 0.12 0.918
KUWAIT 0.60 0.960 UKRAINE −0.81 0.977
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC −1.28 0.976 UNITED KINGDOM 1.76 0.990
LEBANON −0.69 0.953 UNITED STATES 1.63 0.990
LITHUANIA 0.75 0.983 VENEZUELA, RB −1.64 0.938
RL is the Rule of Law index, which reflects perceptions of the extent towhich agents have confidence in and abide by the quality of
contract enforcement, the courts, etc.… -2.5≤RL≤2.5 (Rule of Law) index is taken fromKaufmann, Kray andMastruzzi (2010), Available
online at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports.
Kaufmannet al. (2010) construct theRL indexasaweightedaverageofother indexes and indicators formsources suchas:Worldeconomic
forumglobal competitiveness survey,Global integrity index,Worldbankcountrypolicy and institutional assessments, Institute formanagement
developmentworld competitivenessyearbook,Global insightbusiness riskandconditions, Economist intelligenceunit, etc.…,Wepresent theRL
index for thosecountries thatwecanmakecross-country comparisons,meaning that for eachpair-wisecomparisonofRL indexacross countries,
90%confidence intervalsdonotoverlap, signalingstatistically significantdifferences in theRL indexacross countries.
ECCE denotes the best available proxy for the quality of ECCE, and it is measured by the survival rate to grade 5.
0≤ECCE≤1 (survival rate tograde5) index is taken from"Education for all,GlobalMonitoringReport,- 2012Youth, Skills&Work.Availableonline
at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/efareport/statistics/efa-development-index/ECCE index
(survival rate tograde5) is considered thebestproxyavailable formeasuring thequalityofnational ECCEsystem. In theabstenceof comparable
indicatorsonECCEquality, the survival rate isusedasproxybecauseof itspositive correlationwithaverage international learningassesment
scores. Formore, see:Mullis et al. (2009),Martinet al. (2008, 2012,2013), andEducation for all, GlobalMonitoringReport (2012)
We have data only for 64 countries because of the missmach on data availability from both sources.
All the data are for the year 2010 (ECCE for the school year ending in 2010) because this is the latest year that we can
get the data from both sources.
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labor market integration. Individuals with high natural ability levels who choose to
work in the complex sector may invest less in their training simply because they did
not anticipate the creation of a common labor market area with the country with the
most developed institutions.
More importantly, throughout this paper, we do not discuss a fully factor market
integration. We describe the development of talent in a world where goods and labor
move freely, however, also capital can move freely from one country to the next. The
process of multinationalization and foreign direct investment is another dimension
which is clearly at the heart of talent development, especially for developing countries.
Allowing for such a channel, labor will move toward the country with better developed
institutions, but firms may want to locate in countries where labor is cheaper.
Endnotes
1The assumption of the exogeneity of national institutional quality is widely used in
the recent literature of international trade. For example, Vogel (2007) and Costinot
(2009) among others show that the quality of national institutions play an important
role in the determination of international trade patterns. Also, the assumption of the
exogeneity of ECCE is present in the labor and human capital literature. For example,
Heckman (2000) provides a summary of the human capital literature and concludes
that subsequent investment in skills and trainings is contingent on ECCE because
“learning begets learning.” Therefore, better ECCE makes individuals’ learning easier,
promoting academic progress which in turn makes them more productive, so they
enjoy higher earnings. Moreover, Anderson et al. (4) and Schweinhart et al. (1993) pro-
vide empirical evidence indicating that good early childhood interventions have lasting
positive effects on learning, motivation and future earnings.
2For more, see UNESCO EFA (2003/4, 2010, 2013/4); Mullis (2007), and Martin and
Mullis (2013).
3Our assumption that ECCE is exogenous might seem contentious, assuming that
parents do not respond to incentives when investing in their child development. How-
ever, this is precisely the case in the U.S., at least according to Heckman (2000), who
states (p.25): “It is remarkable in a society as committed to consumer sovereignty and
choice in most aspects of economic and social life as the American society, that there is
so much resistance to permitting choice and instituting incentives in education. The
conventional argument of the educational planners is that parents and students are not
able to make wise choices.” On the other hand, in Japan, ECCE is very closely super-
vised by Japanese mothers. In particular, a mother is evaluated mostly by the high
school that her child enrolls in, and then the university to which her child is admitted.
Sociologists show that Japanese mothers are expected by society to make sacrifices for
their children who, in return, are expected to perform well in school (White 1998). See
also OECD (2010). Therefore, we believe that this cultural, non-institutional environ-
ment may explain the gap between their ECCE indexes despite the fact that the U.S.
has better developed institutions (for example more competent judicial system) than
Japan. See Table 1.
4In our model we assume that there exist complementarities in production be-
tween a manager and a worker in the complex sector, following Kremer (1993). In
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section V, our results rely on the assumption of complementarities in production
between immigrants and natives. This is not an uncommon assumption in the
labor and immigration literature. For example, Lazear (1999) builds a theoretical
model and provides empirical evidence that immigrants and natives who work in
the same team increase a firm’s productivity due to the existence of complemen-
tary factors in its production function, where immigrants bring information which
is complementary to that of the natives. Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) show
theoretically and empirically using plant-level data from Columbia that there are
complementarities in production in firms that hire highly skilled foreign managers
and highly skilled native workers. Foged and Peri (4), using a dataset of individuals
and establishments in Denmark over the period 1991–2008, show, among other
things, that there are complementarities in production among immigrants and na-
tive workers in the service-complex sectors. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) show theor-
etically and empirically that in equilibrium the inflow of immigrants creates a
positive effect on natives due to complementarities in production. Peri (2012),
using three main data sources (U.S. Census, IPUMS & GSP), finds that immigrants
promote task efficient specialization in the native country. See also Peri and Spar-
ber (2009, 2011) for similar results.
5Iranzo and Peri (2009) show that international migration and trade complement
each other in an application to the Eastern-Western European Integration. Peri and
Requena-Silvente (2010), using micro data on individual trade transactions from Span-
ish provinces between 1995 and 2008 and data on Spanish stock of immigrants, show
that immigration promotes international trade mostly because it reduces the fixed costs
of trade, especially for differentiated goods.
6The assumption that in the Y sectors individuals work alone is done solely for presen-
tation purposes. However, all the results of this paper hold if we assume that in the Y sec-
tor, each firm has a worker and a manager with a complementary production function as
in sector X, but in the absence of moral hazard. For more details see Additional file 1:
Appendix A.
7For more, see the detailed solution of stage 3 in Additional file 1: Appendix B.
8This is not a theoretical assumption. The U.S. may enter in this category. For
example, Hoxby (1999) concludes that ECCE and K-12 public schools in the USA,
in particular the inner-city ECCE and K-12 public schools, act as a monopoly, but
the U.S. university system is highly competitive. This is the reason why the higher
educational system is considered successful in the U.S., but there is poor perform-
ance of the U.S. ECCE and K-12 public school system as compared to foreign
countries.
9For example, in the real world, many international students accept scholar-
ships to pursue their studies in countries with better college/university system
such as the U.S. and the U.K. under the condition that they must to return
back to their own countries of origin after graduation and work there for at
least one decade.
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